How to assess the 2026 local elections

We’re now less than three weeks from election day, when alongside the devolved elections in Scotland and Wales, more than 5,000 council seats in England are up for election. Although the direction of the results are highly predictable, with many Labour and Conservative councillors set to lose their seats, often because of factors with nothing to do with them, the scale of the changes are more uncertain, with different results having different implications for the national political landscape.To answer the questions of what the 2026 local election results ‘mean’, we’ll need a framework and some benchmarks. This isn’t going to be me offering solid predictions, that’s not my area. Nor am I going to give any credence to the parties’ definitely real ‘expectations’ of their own performance. Instead, I’m going to highlight the best election metrics to use, as well as their limitations; discuss the plausible range of results for the main parties and what they point to, including giving some historic context; and to posit the ‘known unknowns’ that will only be answered on the night (well, day after these days). Hopefully, this should function as a useful cut-out-and-keep for when the results come in.The 2026 local election results take place against an even more dismal backdrop for the government than last year’s, with Labour having sunk a further six points in voting intention polls. They are now in a similar high-teens territory to the Conservatives, who’ve made no progress on their weak position, and the Greens, who have made significant gains since Zack Polanski became leader last autumn. Ahead of these three are Reform, who have led every national poll since the last local elections, though their lead has declined in recent months after peaking last summer. The Lib Dems trail the rest of the main parties and are down a few points since prior to the last local elections.The proportions of 2024 Labour and Lib Dem voters defecting to the Greens have roughly tripled over the last year, with Zack Polanski’s party now, by clear margins, the largest source of loss for either party. Less than half of 2024 Labour voters are still loyal to the party, even when excluding Don’t Knows. Reform’s earlier poll gains came largely off the back of an increased rate of 2024 Conservatives defecting to the party, while their recent dip stems from about an eighth of 2024 Reform voters defecting rightwards to Restore. As Restore aren’t contesting these locals outside of Great Yarmouth, there is the potential for these voters to return home, bumping Reform’s vote share up by a few points, similar to how Reform’s absence in the 2024 locals boosted the Tory share a little [1].However, when it comes to the local election results, what matters more is the comparison to the baseline, i.e., when these seats were last contested, which is May 2022 for most of the seats up for election this year. This was during the scandal-ridden dying days of the Johnson government, when Labour had already established a lead in the polls, though with the Conservatives still on a third of the vote (incidentally, much above any party today). Relative to this period, both parties are down substantially in comparable polls, with Labour falling by about 21 points and the Tories by around 15. Most of this ground has been made up by Reform (up around 20 points) and the Greens (up as much as 12).For the county council elections delayed from last year, the baseline is instead May 2021, a highpoint for the Johnson government following the successful Covid vaccine rollout. Here, it is the Tory vote that has fallen further, by as much as 26 points, though with Labour still down a huge 15 points. In these contests, Conservative losses are likely to be more severe.The biggest problem in assessing British local elections is that the way they are elected is incredibly messy. From year-to-year, different numbers of councillors are elected in different parts of the country, including sometimes being elected in different ways. This means it’s perfectly plausible for a gain of 200 councillors one year to in practice be a better result than a gain of 700 the next.Given that raw numbers of gains and losses often become the headline figure, perhaps the easiest way to make local elections comparable is to make these figures relative to the respective total number of seats up for election. Using this seat share metric, we can more adequately see how the rate of turnover compares from year-to-year. For instance, while Reform last year made a nominally similar net gain to the Lib Dems in 2019 (around 700), Reform’s gains represented 41% of all seats up for election that year, while the Lib Dems’ accounted for 8% 2019’s contests.However, while change in seat share is good at painting the scale of the overall results, it does have limitations, primarily in terms of being skewed by which seats up for election. For instance, last year, the Conservatives’ net losses amounted to 41% of seats up for election; this year, they are only defending a total of 27% of seats. Even if they lost every single one, it could not, on this metric, be a worse night than last year. Additionally, if you look at the Conservatives’ severe losses in 1971 in isolation, you miss that they came off the back of an exceptionally high watermark result in 1968, with some (though not all) of the losses merely being a return to the norm.A way to get around this is to look at each individual party’s gains and losses as a proportion of the number of seats they are defending. So, if a party is defending 200 seats and they lose 40, they have a proportional loss of 20%, or alternatively a defence rate of 80%. This is particularly useful for comparing the government’s performances year-to-year. We can see that, last year, Labour made a net loss of 66% of the seats it was defending, the joint worst for a government in living memory and roughly four times the average loss rate for a government (about one in six of the seats it is defending).One issue with this metric is that it spits out very large and unhelpful numbers when parties are making large gains from low bases, such as Reform. It is not implausible that the party wins 2,000 seats next month, having won only two last time they were contested. Such a result would give them a proportional change rate of +99,900%, which isn’t exactly instructive, beyond “woah, that’s big”.Of course, change is only part of the picture, and it’s one that can be a little distorted in local elections due to questions of baselines. It’s thus useful to also keep an eye on overall councillor counts.However, when looking at overall councillor numbers, we do have to remember that local elections are an unevenly distributed cycle and that the 2025 and 2026 local elections only account for about 37% of all council seats. So, sure, after these elections, it is likely that Reform will still have fewer councillors than each of the Conservatives, Labour and Lib Dems, but that is almost entirely an artefact of the local election schedule, not a reflection of their support. Similarly, when looking at total councillors elected in any given year, you do have to be wary of skews caused by where in the country local elections have taken place…Beyond seats, local elections also see millions of votes cast, with some liking to use this as a ‘purer’ substitute for Westminster voting intention polls. You can see the appeal, it is after all real votes being cast rather than hypothetical questions being asked, but there are three major caveats in doing this.The most important, and one that the BBC’s projected national share (PNS) and Sky’s national equivalent vote (NEV) do attempt to account for [2], is map bias. As we’ve already covered, not every part of the country has council elections every year, with the local election map in any one year typically advantaging some parties by at least a few points. For instance, last year, the local election map tipped towards more rural and suburban areas, which last May’s British Election Study (BES) shows were about three to four points more likely to back Reform and three to four points less likely to back Labour than Britain as a whole [3]. Applying such a correction to the 31% of votes cast for Reform and 14% for Labour gives rough ‘full map’ vote shares of 27-28% for Reform and 17-18% for Labour [4] [5]. This year, the map tilts more towards urban areas that, on current voting intentions, are about two to three points more likely to favour Labour and about a point less likely to favour Reform than the country as a whole.One thing projected shares can’t account for is who doesn’t vote. It’s well known that turnout is lower in local elections than in general elections, standing at just 34% last May. But what’s sometimes neglected is that doesn’t mean turnout will be evenly lower. In last year’s locals, it seems probable that Reform supporters were more likely to bother voting than those of other parties, particularly Labour and the Greens, to the extent that it pushed Reform’s vote share up by as much as two points [6]. Now, of course, those who indicate support for a party and don’t bother voting in locals are among the people more likely to be flaky when it comes to bothering to vote in a general election, but turnout differential can still be seen among those with a track record of voting in general elections.The third caveat is that people simply do vote differently in general and local elections, with the most consistent rate in recent years being a sizeable amount of tactical switching between Labour, the Lib Dems and the Greens, with this having a net effect that pulls down Labour’s local election vote share. Analysing BES data, we can see this peaked at the 2024 locals, where differing voting patterns reduced Labour’s share by 12 points, while increasing the Lib Dems’ by seven and the Greens’ by three. Last year, though, the net effect of this was much reduced, to no more than three points for any party, with Lib Dem and Green local election voters more likely to give that party as their Westminster voting intention than in previous years.One notable question mark here is that, based on a contextless reading of BES data, Reform also lost a good few points of support at the ballot box. I expect this is almost certainly an artefact of BES being surveyed post-local elections, when you did get an immediate and significant rise in Reform’s Westminster voting intention figures. Given the increase was fuelled predominantly by Conservative to Reform switchers, a group who are largely positive about both parties but pre-local elections disproportionately expressed concern that Reform might be a wasted vote, I would suspect that the locals acted as an ameliorator of this worry, encouraging them it was okay to switch to their more preferred party.Reform are going to gain big, it’s just a question of how big. Ostensibly, to match last year’s performance in terms of seats gained, Reform need a net increase of 2,088 seats. However, because this year’s map is less favourable to Reform, I don’t think this is necessarily the most appropriate ‘matching’ benchmark for the party, as such a repeat would really be a better result than last May. Plus, if Reform are getting that high, a more notable target is 2,120 seats, which would match the record rate of gains as a proportion of all seats set by Labour in the 1971 borough council elections. A target towards the lower end of expectations is roughly 1,700 gains, which would take the party to around 15% of all councillors in Britain.What is instead more important with Reform is to look at where they are gaining seats, with a particular test for whether they are taking control in the areas that overlap with their majority markers for Westminster [7]. Here, Reform winning in strongly Leave areas is not that interesting. It doesn’t matter so much if they take majority control of Essex county or Barnsley, that’s more than expected [8]. It’s whether or not they are able to win control of a range of councils like Barking and Dagenham, Bromley, Gateshead, Hampshire, Huntingdonshire, Milton Keynes, Swindon and West Sussex that show the plausibility of a Reform parliamentary majority. Strong performances in Birmingham and Bradford, as well as the seats up for election on councils such as Bury, Colchester, Hastings, Rushmoor, West Lancashire, Wolverhampton and Worthing can likewise demonstrate their viability.How Reform performs on the projected shares will also be a key test. Given the Restore caveat of their current voting intention figures, we should really be expecting Reform to be up a few points on their performance last May, though due to a few factors, such as a potential closing of the turnout differential, a figure of no change would not inherently be a cause for concern for the party. The worry will set in if projected shares show the party down on last year, which would signal the party is losing momentum and confirm its downward trend seen in polls.On election night, if you down a shot every time a Labour politician or supporter says “every government suffers losses in local elections”, you’ll have a blood alcohol level higher than the Labour vote share by midnight. Even quicker if you go for doubles every time a specific allusion is made to 1999 or 2000 [9]. To be fair, unlike a lot of received elections wisdom in Westminster, it is largely true, being so about four times out of five. But to be more accurate, there isn’t a single plausible prediction that places Labour’s expected losses anywhere near the average one in six for a government, particularly those that build off council by-election results, where Labour has lost three quarters of the seats it was defending in the last year.As such, Labour’s benchmarks are really which historical records they are breaking:-463: takes Labour below the average rate of defence for a government over the last sixty local elections-880: worse than Labour’s rate of defence at the 2000 local elections, their worst during New Labour’s first term in office-1,040: worse than the Conservatives’ rate of defence at the 1981 local elections, the lowest rate for a government that was subsequently re-elected-1,232: worse than the Conservatives’ rate of defence at the 2024 local elections, also placing their performance in the top 10 worst defences for a government over the last sixty years-1,350: roughly takes Labour below 25% of all councillors for the first time since prior to the 2011 local elections-1,687: worse than Labour’s rate of defence from last year-1,700: worse than Labour’s rate of defence at the 2009 local elections, their worst on record-1,745: worse than the Conservatives’ rate of defence from last year, currently the worst on record for either party-1,763: worse than the SNP’s rate of defence at the 1980 local elections, the worst for any significant party except UKIP during their post-Brexit implosion-2,000: roughly takes Labour below the 21.4% of councillors held after the 2009 local elections, their lowest point in recent times-2,078: worse than the Conservatives’ seat losses as a proportion of all seats from last year, the worst on record, making it close to inarguable Labour have suffered the worst local election result for any party ever-2,150: worse than the Conservatives’ actual net seat loss at the 1995 local elections, the highest number for any party since local government reform in the 1970s (13,000 seats were up for election that year)-2,250: roughly takes Labour below 20% of all councillors (which would also likely mean that no party holds more than a fifth of all councillors)Additionally, some individual losses would hold particular historical value. Labour’s at-risk majorities on Barnsley, Gateshead, Sunderland and Wakefield councils have been maintained since the authorities were created in their present form in the 1970s, with control of Barnsley and Gateshead’s predecessor councils having even survived Labour’s nadir in the late 1960s. Barking and Dagenham is the only London borough Labour has retained majority control of since its creation in 1964, including at the 1968 elections where Labour won outright in just three of the 32 boroughs [10]. Indeed, the 1968 London result is one to keep top of mind as the results come in, as Labour falling as low as they did then in either councils (largest party on four, of which three had majorities) or councillors (350) would be the point at which a dire result would become bordering on existential.Beyond seat and council losses, Labour will also be hoping to avoid falling to fifth place on the projected shares, which is a real possibility, though due to the aforementioned differences in voting patterns would not necessarily indicate they would’ve finished fifth in a contemporaneous general election (fourth would be more accurate, providing there isn’t an unexpected Lib Dem surge). Vote share in London will also be test of the party’s shape. As they have viability in more of the capital’s various party systems than any other party, coming first could still be possible even if they lose on every council. Sinking below the 28% won in 2006 would be their worst vote share to date across the boroughs, while not finishing in the top two would be a disaster, especially coming on the same day as such a result in Wales.Since 2019, the Greens have made solid and fairly consistent gains in every set of local elections, with the party now holding 5% of all councillors in Great Britain. If their rate of gains over the last three years are repeated this year, it would amount to a further 140 seats, roughly doubling the number they are defending on 7th May. But with the Greens’ substantial rise in voting intention polls, this benchmark should be passed several times over.Given how central local election success was to the Greens winning their three target seats at the last general election, how far they can advance now will be a good guide to what can plausibly be on their target list for next time. Gaining control of Lambeth and Lewisham would suggest the party is well-placed for around two to three dozen MPs, while emerging as the largest party in the seats up for election in places like Camden, Manchester, Oxford or Southwark would indicate a party with a reasonable chance in about 10% of constituencies. Similar showings in Ealing, Greenwich, Leeds, Newcastle and Reading, as well as in the more rural parts of West Sussex, would point to a party with potential in over 100 parliamentary seats. The Greens can also further their momentum by winning more seats than Reform on the few councils where both are competitive, or at least should be on current polling numbers. These include Barking and Dagenham, Bradford and Hastings.The Greens will also need to prove themselves in terms of votes, with anything less than the high teens on the projected shares being a disappointment for the party. Nonetheless, a top three finish should be the central expectation, with beating both Labour and the Lib Dems a major victory in itself, and altogether the party should be racking up several hundred seat gains. A best ever result in terms of gains as a share of total seats isn’t going to be that hard, only 151 gains would be needed to break 2023’s record, while meeting 2019’s record of their largest proportional gain (+273%, translating to 393 seats) should be within reach. A higher end target would be passing 572 gains, which would match the Lib Dems’ best performance in modern local elections as a proportion of seats up for election, while the roughly 900 gains required to hold 10% of all councillors in Britain is a longshot.When parties return to opposition from government, they typically make quite significant gains in the first few local elections, if for no other reason than the previous opposition tends to overshoot a little towards the end of their time out of office and end up acquiring seats that are easy come, easy go. Across their mid-terms, both William Hague and Ed Miliband were able to expand their parties’ councillor bases by roughly 50%, with average gains representing 12% of seats up for election each year. The equivalent this year would be a net gain of just under 600 seats.But that’s the kind of benchmark that isn’t really needed for the Tories this time, as losses are near-certain. A net loss of 342 seats means that Kemi Badenoch has, once again, broken Jeremy Corbyn’s previous record for worst defence rate of a primary opposition party, while a net loss of roughly 500 seats would take the party below a fifth of all councillors for the first time since 1997. There’s a close bunch of benchmarks around the -700 mark, including equalling their defence rates at the pre-landslide defeat locals of 1996 and 2024, but the key one is at around 720 losses, where they fall below the 18.8% of councillors they held after the 1996 locals, their lowest ebb in living memory. Given this is roughly in line with the party’s defence rate in council by-elections over the last year, such a result is eminently plausible.Because their baseline is a little more favourable than last year, the party shouldn’t suffer as severe a rate of losses this year, but just in case, it’s a net loss of 930 that would indicate they’ve beaten last year’s record.There are, though, some slight specks of light for the party. Since 2022, their vote has fallen less in London than elsewhere (-8 vs -15 in comparable Westminster polling [11]), while Labour’s fall in the capital is in line with their national decline (-21 vs -22). This particularly relative swing should enable the Tories to make gains on the few councils where none of the other opposition parties are particularly viable, such as being able to enhance their majority on Harrow. These results are not so much surprises as representing the few ecological niches where the party is able to hold on at present.For those in the party, comparisons to last year will be particularly important, as believers in the much conjectured ‘Keminaissance’ do need some level of real-world progress to point to. An improvement in their projected shares would be sufficient for this, though given it was a particular source of disagreement between the BBC and Sky’s numbers last year, this would need to be across both sets of numbers to be meaningful. But it mustn’t be ignored that an improvement on a bad trend is not the same as reversing the trend, which currently places the Tories on track to fall to fourth place in overall councillor counts next year, with a real risk of falling below 10% of all councillors by the end of the local election cycle, having held nearly 40% just five years ago.The Lib Dems’ fate at these local elections is perhaps the least clear-cut. They come into them after a year of solid gains in council by-elections (at a rate that would translate to somewhere between 320-420 gains in these locals [12]), but with question marks within the party about their stagnant if not worsening poll numbers despite the government’s unpopularity. They also face the problem of their current local election expansion strategy potentially running out of road, simply because they’ve successfully acquired nearly all of the councils they were targeting. Beyond solidifying their majorities, there just aren’t that many potential further gains without a change in tack.Nonetheless, they should still be able to make reasonable gains this year, simply because most Lib Dem target seats are Conservative-facing and the Tories are still well down against the baseline. Even if the Lib Dems end up falling back a few points on the projected shares, which would be worrying for the party, they should be able to mask this by getting themselves over the line on councils like Gosport, Stockport, Three Rivers and West Oxfordshire.A basic benchmark for the Lib Dems would be net gains of around 210, which would be in line with their average gain rate from 2022-24. Doubling this to around 420 would produce a symbolic victory, as it would finally draw them level with the proportion of all councillors they held after the 2010 local elections, pre-coalition. To match their rate of gains from last year, they need a net increase of just over 500, while 573 is the threshold needed to better 1993 as their best set of local elections as measured by gains as a proportion of total contests.One datapoint to keep an eye on is the overall councillor counts for England. Accounting for the changes in Surrey, the Lib Dems currently trail Labour by about 2,200 councillors and the Tories by about 900. If the Lib Dems perform towards the higher end of predictions and the Conservatives and Labour towards the lower end, it is feasible that the Lib Dems close these gaps and end up as the largest party in English local government. Such a result would definitely be a good night.While the results overall are a little bit of ‘known unknowns’, as we broadly know the directions, just not the extents, there are some particular questions that can only really be answered on the day.Turnout: Recent by-elections in Caerphilly and Gorton and Denton have been notable for their reasonably healthy turnouts for non-general elections, with this attributed to highly motivated Reform and ‘stop Reform’ votes. Given that last May, there was widespread doubt of Reform’s ability to make substantial gains, including complacent claims that their vote was too inefficient, the motivation for ‘stop Reform’ was lower and was likely in part behind the differential turnout. This year, with Reform’s electoral viability more established, it will be interesting to see whether this translates to more ‘stop Reform’ turnout at the local elections.Tactical voting: Likewise, how patterns of tactical voting hold up, evolve and emerge will be important to keep an eye on. While local elections in the last parliament previewed the success of ‘stop the Tories’ tactical voting at the last general election, Caerphilly and Gorton, as well as recent studies, suggest multiple patterns of tactical voting are now in play, particularly ‘stop Reform’ and ‘stop Labour’. How vote change varies between different types of contest will be instructive here, though as local council elections tend to be lower information contests, I suspect there will be a lot of messiness due to the most effective tactical challenger being unclear in some cases.Spotting the micro-trends: The Conservatives’ sole gain of Leicester East at the last general election will not have been surprising to anyone paying attention to the detail of local elections in the previous parliament. Sure, the gain was a little ahead of schedule and aided by a fragmented opposition, but it was clear in council results that British Hindus were trending sharply away from Labour and towards the Tories for several years prior to 2024. Similar specific trends are likely to be going on below the hood in this parliament, so look out for them and you might be able to predict trend buckers at future general elections.Labour’s collapse: The 2022 local elections were the first of the three where the shape of Labour’s vote at the 2024 general election gradually began to solidify. As such, the shape of Labour’s collapse, particularly whether it is more uniform or more proportional, is likely to be helpful in understanding how their vote could change at the next general election.Conservatives vs Reform: Some local Conservative parties, particularly in more Lib Dem-y areas like parts of Hampshire, have been expressing strong anti-Reform messages in their campaign literature, including appeals for tactical votes. Whether these strategies are able to work and, if they do, are more successful than Conservative strategies in other areas will be worth watching, particularly given they tend to deviate in tone from the national party (such as prominently featuring environmental issues).Rural Greens: Although the extent of there being two wholly distinct Green bases has often been overstated, in part due to people not being aware of ecological fallacies, there is undoubtedly a degree of difference between the party’s gains in urban areas and rural areas. With Polanski’s leadership taking a left-populist message more suited to their urban areas of strength, whether there is a divergence in Green behaviour between there two types of seats is something to watch out for.Lib Dem dip: As the Lib Dem polling dip is almost entirely down to an increase in the rate of 2024 Lib Dems defecting to the Greens, my suspicion is that it is more a question of shifting first preferences than outright rejection of the Lib Dems, making it more akin to Conservative to Reform defections than Labour to Reform ones. Of course, this would still present some issues for the party, but would mean such voters’ choices are malleable in contests where the Lib Dems require their votes as opposed to ones where they do not. Look out for variation in Lib Dem and Green vote change depending on the context of the Lib Dems.[1] Based on BES data, 30% of Reform intenders who voted in the May 2024 locals backed the Tories, while 21% backed minor parties or independents. They were also less likely to turnout than other groups of intenders, though more likely to do so than 2019 voters who were now unsure of who to vote for. Overall, this may have increased the Tory share in 2024 by about two points.[2] These are typically reported as ‘what it would look like if local elections happened everywhere’, though do methodologically deviate from this in a few ways due to a focus on modelling support for the national parties. A full explanation of the PNS methodology is available here: https://electionsetc.com/2025/05/01/understanding-the-local-elections-projected-national-share-pns-in-2025/.[3] Deviation between Westminster voting intention in areas with council elections and all of Great Britain: Con +1.8, Lab -3.4, LD +2.1, Ref +3.5, Grn -1.1, Nat/Oth -3.0.[4] Overall 2025 local election vote shares, via Elections Centre/House of Commons Library: Ref 30.8, Con 23.1, LD 17.0, Lab 14.0, Grn 9.0, Oth 6.2. Rough ‘full map’ estimates: Ref 27-28%, Con 21-22%, Lab 17-18%, LD 14-15%, Grn 9-10%, Nat/Oth 9-10%.[5] Noticeably, such a share for Reform is lower than that estimated by the BBC’s PNS (30%) or Sky’s NEV (32%). Ultimately, I do not see how a party that contested nearly every ward and won 31% of votes cast on a map skewed several points in their favour could have a ‘national equivalent’ higher than their actual share, so suspect the model did overestimate them in this case, likely because of the difficulties in estimating a party that had functionally appeared out of nowhere under a methodology focussed on vote change. Ultimately, it should not be forgotten these are models with margins of error.[6] Not just did the change in turnout from 2021 correlate with the Reform share of the vote, but British Election Study data shows a difference in voting intention between those who voted in locals and all people in areas that had locals (Ref +2.2, Con +0.5, LD +0.1, Grn -1.1, Lab -1.2), as well as suggesting that 2024 Reform voters were around 25% more likely to bother voting than 2024 Labour voters.[7] While, of course, council results don’t perfectly map onto Westminster results, certain patterns do indicate certain things, such as how Labour gaining Aldershot and Cannock Chase in the 2024 local elections indicated they were on course for around 400 seats in a general election.[8] That said, Essex county council’s electoral divisions that overlap with the constituency of Chelmsford may be of interest, given the city is Reform’s 326 marker (i.e. the seat that takes them over the line for a parliamentary majority on a uniform swing target list) based on majorities at the last election. Based on vote share ranked from highest to lowest, such a role is held by Birmingham Selly Oak.[9] Not just is the scale of losses very likely going to be much worse than in 1999 or 2000, but it’s also worth remembering that are starting from a much lower base today. Going into the 1999 local elections, Labour held nearly half of all councillors (47%), compared to only around a third (33%) today.[10] The others being Southwark and Tower Hamlets, which Labour have lost majority control of at other elections. Newham has also remained under Labour administration since 1964, though this was without a majority from 1968-71. Greenwich and Haringey councils have also seen Labour majorities at every election except 1968, when the Conservatives won outright control in both cases.[11] This gap is also true when looking at proportional change (Con -44% GB, -30% London). It isn’t just an artefact of the Conservatives starting lower in London.[12] Translation of council by-election results since May 2025 onto 2026 local election numbers based on hold/loss rates for each party: Con -770, Lab -1990, LD +420, Grn +250, Ref +1930; based on defence rates for parties: Con -630, Lab -1950, LD +320. Via data from Mark Pack. Personally, I think it’s good for a rough picture, but think that certain clear over/underperformances relative to these figures are very plausible.No posts