Can Britain’s reserves defend the UK in a crisis?

George Allison

Giving oral evidence to the committee’s inquiry into national resilience, Lieutenant General Sir Charles Collins, Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, Lieutenant General Paul Griffiths, Commander of Standing Joint Command, and Damian Johnson, the MoD’s Director of Homeland Security, outlined the framework being developed to meet both NATO Article Three obligations and domestic resilience requirements.

Johnson set out the Cabinet Office Home Defence Programme as the overarching cross-government effort, describing it as “a cross-government program to enhance national resilience and preparedness, so that the UK is even better able to withstand the sub-threshold attacks that we are under now and is better prepared to deter crisis and conflict in the future.” He confirmed that defence plans are being updated as part of a national defence plan, with NATO’s Steadfast Defender 27 exercise earmarked as the point at which those plans will be fully tested, describing it as planned to be “the largest mobilisation exercise since the Cold War.”

General Collins acknowledged the shift in how defence must now think about the homeland, noting that the traditional expeditionary concept of defending at range no longer fully applies. “Long-range systems, hybrid warfare means we’re at danger at home,” he said, adding that under NATO the UK has not only an Article Five but an Article Three obligation to look after itself in crisis. He said the UK is now part of a regional NATO plan, North West, to be commanded by a British four-star out of Norfolk by the end of the year.

General Griffiths outlined his operational plan for homeland defence under the title Fortitude, comprising four strands. The first, Reliance, connects eight joint military commands into local resilience forums across the country. The second, Sentinel, covers the defence of critical national infrastructure. The third, Genesis, addresses mass mobilisation and growing the military workforce. The fourth, Ford, covers the movement and protection of military assets as forces transition from crisis to conflict.

On reserves, General Collins described three categories: an operational reserve of up to 32,000, a reinforcement reserve of specialists drawn largely from industry, and a strategic reserve of around 35,000 former regulars. He said proposals under the forthcoming Defence Readiness Bill would lift the recall liability age to 65, and that Steadfast Defender 27 would test the recall system. “People feel that once they’ve left service, but still liable, they’re part of the force, which we haven’t done in the past,” he said.

General Griffiths was more direct about the purpose gap that has hampered reserve recruitment and retention, saying “I don’t think we’ve been as clear as we could be” about what is required of reservists. He described Genesis as the vehicle for reconnecting with the strategic reserve this year, and said the Brave Defender exercise series would run in parallel with Steadfast Defender to test Article Three homeland obligations alongside Article Five collective defence commitments.

On recruitment more broadly, Griffiths offered a positive assessment, saying it was the first time in approximately four years that more people had joined than left the armed forces. He cited reduced friction in the recruitment pipeline, improved branding and childcare provision as contributing factors, and confirmed the Army’s gap year scheme is due to begin in September 2026.

The question of a new civilian reserve specifically focused on protecting critical national infrastructure drew a measured response from Johnson, who confirmed the SDR had recommended exploring such a force and that advice to ministers is being prepared. “Defence should look at a new deal for what else it can do to support other lead government departments and industry on critical national infrastructure,” he said.

On the Defence Readiness Bill, which did not appear in the King’s Speech, General Collins was clear it would not slow existing work. “It’s not going to stop us getting ready,” he said, while acknowledging legislation would make the national liability “more robust.” Johnson said the approach would be evidence-led, informed by planning and exercise activity rather than legislating for its own sake.

The session forms part of a wider inquiry by the committee, chaired by Baroness Coussins, which is due to report in November 2026.

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Can anyone tell me exactly how can army reservist be guarding the UK homeland in a time of crisis. There are only two conceivable enemies we can face, one is on the other side of the planet with zero capacity to project power beyond its immediate vicinity and its unlikely it will ever have capacity to project power in the North Atlantic. The other could not get an invasion force 40 miles from its own border in a surprise attack against one of the weakest countries in Europe. I fail to see what role a reservist army can play in the UK. Any threat we face is air or naval. If it’s a matter of terrorism or civil unrest these are a job for the police.

By your logic, we don’t really need an army at all. Acknowledging that the era of expeditionary wars of choice is over and that any NATO obligation is a spending commitment only, there are tasks for which ground forces are needed. ( Capability commitments are not treaty mandated) Terrorism and violent uprising cannot be handled by the police alone. Northern Ireland showed that as did the protracted state of emergency in France. We need to be able to defend our own possessions against possible threats- Falklands, Gibraltar etc, or decide to give them up. GBAD is almost non existent, yet current wars show how real the threat of long range drones and missiles is. Pretty much everything else is a matter of choice, giving political leaders options. Many bemoan the small 148 MBT force but is it in fact too big for Britain’s own needs? To some extent, the choices are about retaining capabilities we might need in the future and need to scale up quickly. Which brings us back to reserves.

Peter, this 148 CR3 fleet will not be too big for Britains needs – if you were joking, sorry but I did not understand the joke! We are required to deploy two divisions to the ARRC – 1st and 3rd divisions. 3 (UK) Div is the ‘armoured force’ and has three armoured regiments. That is where the bulk of those tanks are going. The ARRC is a vital NATO commitment for us and is one of SACEUR’s two strategic back-up formations and will clearly be employed in eastern Europe if the balloon goes up. The regiments will have to be reduced to Type 44 as we will not have enough tanks for Type 56/58. Thus just 132 tanks will be in the field army and that leaves a mere 16 to be divvied up between the Trg Org (RAC and REME), Repair Pool and Attrition Reserve. The Options for Change defence review of summer 1990 carefully worked out the size and structure of the post-Cold War army; it concluded that the army should shrink by a massive 25% to just 120,000 regulars and 50,000 TA… and only needed 386 tanks, rather than about 900 Chieftain/Challenger 1s. So, 386 CR2 tanks were duly ordered to replace the older tanks. The many cuts since 1990/91 have been entirely driven by a Government (of both stripes) view that we should repeatedly cut the armed forces in favour of social programmes and not on the basis of a marked reduced threat since the fall of the Berlin Wall.

It wasn’t a joke but part of a genuine question about what the army is for. Under our capability commitments, we should be contributing the armoured land force you describe. But whilst Article 5 ( budget ) and Article 3 ( national resilience) are mandatory, if ignored by many members for years, capability commitments are negotiable and can be changed. So in theory we could spend our budget entirely on naval and air forces. I tried to set out a few reasons why this isn’t tenable but that still leaves difficult questions about how large a land force we need and what its equipment should be. Two things need to be borne in mind- We are in unpredictable times so cannot be sure in our planning assumptions. We should never again deploy inadequate sized forces as we did in Iraq and Afghanistan. My instinct is that we probably need a rather larger army than we have now, with greater emphasis on GBAD.

Thanks Peter, I have heard people (usually civilians or the media) ask what the army is for, since the end of the Cold War to my constant bafflement. The army, as ever, has no single neatly defined role. It has multiple roles and military tasks, almost too many to list. The lay purist will just say that the army’s role is to train for war, but that is unhelpful and does not even cover all the potential roles and tasks. Certainly the times are less predictable than the Cold War but even then I bet not many prior to 1969 expected the army (at its peak some 21,000 soldiers) to deploy large numbers of soldiers to one part of the UK supporting the police deal with maintaining Public Order and then to transition to Counter-Insurgency/Counter-Terrorism tasks….and to do that alongside 6,500 UDR soldiers for 38 years! Probably also not many expected that the army would send a brigade plus to the Falklands (alongside RN/RM/RAF) prior to 1982. I very much agree that inadequate numbers of troops were sent to Iraq and Afghanistan. I calculated that we needed an infantry division in the latter. GBAD – the army has just 6 SkySabre launchers (plus other AD kit) – quite ridiculous and a far cry from Rapier numbers – still, 7 more are on order!

Indeed. I just rechecked army numbers across European NATO members. Relative to population size, the British Army is very small. Countries like France and Italy have significantly larger ground forces, with para military Gendarmerie/Carabinieri to support. Is Italy really more vulnerable to attack than the UK? I don’t think so. The small size of UK ground forces must limit the army’s flexibility in tackling sudden unexpected challenges. So whilst Future Soldier looks a decent attempt to rationalise its structure, there isn’t much resilience. The biggest problem the overall defence budget faces is the growing cost of DNE now accounting for 40% of the equipment spend. The submarine fleet, even with its current limited availability,absorbs @ 50% of the RN equipment budget. AUKUS will only increase that.

It’s not my logic, it is geography, with us being an island and all and France and Ireland not being a threat. A lot of this smacks of the army attempting to stay relevant in a fight it’s not cut out for. The army doesn’t want to actually change into something more useful it wants to cram as many infantry battalions and cap badges into a structure and pretend that’s what’s needed. We do face threats in the UK homeland and those are from drones, ballistic and cruise missiles as well as cyber space. The army has never shown much interest in those domains in the past. I would question why it suddenly seems to be all over home defence now. The US national guard operates NASAMS but there is no equivalent in UK service (only martlet operated by 106th (Yeomanry) Regiment Royal Artillery. The army has never shown much interest in home defence and even less in using its reservists. If the army wants to do something useful it should concentrate on providing GBAD/ABM for the UK instead of pretending to provide thousands of soldiers (all with appropriate cap badges Offcourse) to either defend the country from a non existent threat or provide a secondary police force to stand around guarding installations or keeping the populace inline.

Well that’s not true. The Army has consistently been cutting infantry battalions and amalgamating cap badges? It’s also been constantly changing, if anything it needs a break from change. As for the army not being interested in home defence, that’s not exactly true. Maybe you don’t remember the cold war, but the Army maintained 9 small TA brigades consisting of small numbers (sometimes as few as two) of light role TA battalions for home defence, plus the forces stationed in Northern Ireland.

Hi Dern, I do remember the old TA brigades But the modern British army shows no such interest, it’s the same expeditionary force built around colonial policing missions that’s it’s been since the late 90’s but now it’s trying to mascaraed as a home defence force to stay relevant with the latest funding trends post SDR. One only has to look at the ORBAT. Only a single Reserve brigade which is fitted in to 1st Division and its primary role is to retain cap badges and provide resiliency for 1st Division to deploy to Central Europe. The army has an extensive GBAD system purely based on defending a deployed division sized force. Zero for home defence. If the army was serious about resiliency it would have significantly more independent brigades in the reserves just like the TA did and these would not be attached to deployable divisions that are already committed to NATO in Eastern Europe. Above all it would have invested in significantly more ground based air defence to provide protection for the UK mainland. The army chose not to do this and instead invest in expeditionary capabilities for decades while gutting the TA. And now it wants a bunch of light infantry standing outs side power stations and airports to justify having more light infantry and pretending these people are providing home defence.

Can you point to any time since the Good Friday Agreement when there has been a need for a Home Service Force from any of the branches of the armed forces? On one hand you whine that the army doesn’t adapt, then you complain in the same breath that the army didn’t prioritise a mission set that clearly was not a priority for the nation or the continent. So which is it? The only cap badges retained by 19L brigade are the SNIY and QOY, you could cut the entire brigade and not endager a single cap badge beyond those two RAC Regiments so I don’t buy that. It also doesn’t provide resilience for 1 Div, it provides individual augmentees to the rest of the army. But also you are once again crying at both ends of the candle. Your upset that, now that great power comptetition and war in europe is back on the table the army is giving thought to Home Defence, but also that 19L brigade doesn’t have much to do? Oh and then again you are complaining that the Army, during a time when expeditionary wars where common and war in Europe was unthinkable, didn’t prioritise Home Defence? Sorry if you’d have suggested those funding priorities in the 2000’s you’d have quite rightly been considered mad. Oh the old Light Infantry quip, always repeated by people who haven’t actually paid attention to the way the army has been evolving and moving away from Light Infantry. But as I said: you can’t make your mind up about what to be upset about. Crying about Homeland Defence and the AR being gutted, while at the same time cursing the army for taking a look at home defence again.

This isn’t talking about reservists defending the UK from an invasion. Think more in terms of national resilience: protecting critical infrastructure, supporting mobilisation, guarding ports, airbases and logistics hubs, maintaining military throughput, and keeping the country functioning during a wider crisis or conflict. Sub threshold threats like cyber attacks, sabotage, drones and wider infrastructure disruption are part of that picture. You also have to plan for knock on effects, including civil unrest if things like internet, fuel supply, transport and shops are disrupted for any length of time. Civil unrest is offcourse primarily a policing responsibility, even during major incidents. The military only comes in under Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA) arrangements and in support of civil authorities, not as a replacement for them. We saw this during the 2011 riots and COVID, where the Armed Forces provided large scale logistical and operational support while police remained the lead agency.

NHS being the lead during COVID, not the police… oh were they? 👀

Yes the NHS was the lead in COVID not the Army The police are the lead in UK civilian security Might surprise you to know the Army doesn’t protect UK air bases. Feel free to look it up but there is an organisation that has this exact job and it’s not the army

Yes, Jim. But in war existing organisations need augmenting, and you use the biggest pool available, which is Army, be it an RAF Station, port, depot, whatever. If you’re referring to the MPGS, they were under the PM (A) which is an Army post. I think they might be under SJC now, which is the Command at Aldershot that orchestrates home defence activity, again, an Army organisation.

And if in fact you mean the RAF Regiment, they protect the deployed RAF abroad, as part of FP Wings. Home defense wise, I think they have small Station Flights and are of course augmented by the RAuxAF Regiment Squadrons at a handful of places.

If the Brown stuff really did hit the Fan Daniele,i would happily sign up for any RAF SRF Requirement – no ifs,no buts,that would be my only offer.

The biggest pool available in a time of war will be provided by what ever organisation we today decide to fund in peace time. Are we not better to fund a proper home defence force or a French style Gndarmerie instead of more reservist slotted into an expeditionary army that’d still heavily focused on a colonial policing via very light infantry and special forces.

Might surprise you that soldiers don’t usually provide care in care homes, yet they did during COVID, along with many other roles that aren’t part of their day to day job. It’s about surge capacity under MACA during a crisis, not replacing the lead organisation.

MACA is not really fit for purpose to be honest.. it’s profoundly bureaucratic.. the service needing the support..puts the request to the category 1 responder organisation it reports to major incident room.. the incident room leaders then if they agree to the support need and cannot meet push a request to the wider local resilience forum ( all the cat1 providers gold commanders ) if they cannot find the resources they put in a MACA this goes up to ministerial responsibility person who decides ( ministers of health for NHS/Ambulance home office for police etc) if they are willing to release funds to pay the MOD for the MACA if they then have a minister to minister conversation with the MOD.. if the the MOD clear the request then send a request down to the appropriate executive agency ( armed forces ) who decides how or if they will respond.. this goes back to the MOD the over to the other minister and back down to the local resilience forum who then contact whichever CO in the armed force they have been told will be helping out.. My experience of MACA is that to be very blunt the dying has already happened before any MACA gets to a minister. It’s an utter chocolate teapot designed by a bureaucrat in the MOD to protect their fiefdom from having requests made of it.. I’ve seen people die without aid that could have been easily given and I’ve seen managers of services who tried cross sidestep to get that aid utterly hammered.. and I’m taking about people dying in their homes when something as simple as a 4 by 4 and a drive could have made a difference… I find MACA an utter joke and disgusting travesty to be honest…

Although, for balance – I led the workforce strategy for the vaccination campaign and Defence provided 56 individual vaccinators. The clinical NHS workforce was 125,000

Any threat we face is air or naval. If it’s a matter of terrorism or civil unrest these are a job for the police.

It’s not my logic, it is geography, with us being an island and all and France and Ireland not being a threat.

A lot of this smacks of the army attempting to stay relevant in a fight it’s not cut out for. The army doesn’t want to actually change into something more useful it wants to cram as many infantry battalions and cap badges into a structure and pretend that’s what’s needed.

We do face threats in the UK homeland and those are from drones, ballistic and cruise missiles as well as cyber space. The army has never shown much interest in those domains in the past. I would question why it suddenly seems to be all over home defence now.

The US national guard operates NASAMS but there is no equivalent in UK service (only martlet operated by 106th (Yeomanry) Regiment Royal Artillery.

The army has never shown much interest in home defence and even less in using its reservists. If the army wants to do something useful it should concentrate on providing GBAD/ABM for the UK instead of pretending to provide thousands of soldiers (all with appropriate cap badges Offcourse) to either defend the country from a non existent threat or provide a secondary police force to stand around guarding installations or keeping the populace inline.

Well that’s not true. The Army has consistently been cutting infantry battalions and amalgamating cap badges? It’s also been constantly changing, if anything it needs a break from change.

As for the army not being interested in home defence, that’s not exactly true. Maybe you don’t remember the cold war, but the Army maintained 9 small TA brigades consisting of small numbers (sometimes as few as two) of light role TA battalions for home defence, plus the forces stationed in Northern Ireland.

Hi Dern, I do remember the old TA brigades

But the modern British army shows no such interest, it’s the same expeditionary force built around colonial policing missions that’s it’s been since the late 90’s but now it’s trying to mascaraed as a home defence force to stay relevant with the latest funding trends post SDR.

One only has to look at the ORBAT. Only a single Reserve brigade which is fitted in to 1st Division and its primary role is to retain cap badges and provide resiliency for 1st Division to deploy to Central Europe.

The army has an extensive GBAD system purely based on defending a deployed division sized force. Zero for home defence.

If the army was serious about resiliency it would have significantly more independent brigades in the reserves just like the TA did and these would not be attached to deployable divisions that are already committed to NATO in Eastern Europe. Above all it would have invested in significantly more ground based air defence to provide protection for the UK mainland. The army chose not to do this and instead invest in expeditionary capabilities for decades while gutting the TA.

And now it wants a bunch of light infantry standing outs side power stations and airports to justify having more light infantry and pretending these people are providing home defence.

The only cap badges retained by 19L brigade are the SNIY and QOY, you could cut the entire brigade and not endager a single cap badge beyond those two RAC Regiments so I don’t buy that. It also doesn’t provide resilience for 1 Div, it provides individual augmentees to the rest of the army. But also you are once again crying at both ends of the candle. Your upset that, now that great power comptetition and war in europe is back on the table the army is giving thought to Home Defence, but also that 19L brigade doesn’t have much to do?

Oh and then again you are complaining that the Army, during a time when expeditionary wars where common and war in Europe was unthinkable, didn’t prioritise Home Defence? Sorry if you’d have suggested those funding priorities in the 2000’s you’d have quite rightly been considered mad.

Oh the old Light Infantry quip, always repeated by people who haven’t actually paid attention to the way the army has been evolving and moving away from Light Infantry. But as I said: you can’t make your mind up about what to be upset about. Crying about Homeland Defence and the AR being gutted, while at the same time cursing the army for taking a look at home defence again.

NHS being the lead during COVID, not the police… oh were they? 👀

If the Brown stuff really did hit the Fan Daniele,i would happily sign up for any RAF SRF Requirement – no ifs,no buts,that would be my only offer.

Although, for balance – I led the workforce strategy for the vaccination campaign and Defence provided 56 individual vaccinators. The clinical NHS workforce was 125,000

This isn’t talking about reservists defending the UK from an invasion.

Think more in terms of national resilience: protecting critical infrastructure, supporting mobilisation, guarding ports, airbases and logistics hubs, maintaining military throughput, and keeping the country functioning during a wider crisis or conflict. Sub threshold threats like cyber attacks, sabotage, drones and wider infrastructure disruption are part of that picture.

You also have to plan for knock on effects, including civil unrest if things like internet, fuel supply, transport and shops are disrupted for any length of time.

Civil unrest is offcourse primarily a policing responsibility, even during major incidents. The military only comes in under Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA) arrangements and in support of civil authorities, not as a replacement for them. We saw this during the 2011 riots and COVID, where the Armed Forces provided large scale logistical and operational support while police remained the lead agency.

NHS being the lead during COVID, not the police… oh were they? 👀

If the Brown stuff really did hit the Fan Daniele,i would happily sign up for any RAF SRF Requirement – no ifs,no buts,that would be my only offer.

Although, for balance – I led the workforce strategy for the vaccination campaign and Defence provided 56 individual vaccinators. The clinical NHS workforce was 125,000

NHS being the lead during COVID, not the police… oh were they? 👀

If the Brown stuff really did hit the Fan Daniele,i would happily sign up for any RAF SRF Requirement – no ifs,no buts,that would be my only offer.

Although, for balance – I led the workforce strategy for the vaccination campaign and Defence provided 56 individual vaccinators. The clinical NHS workforce was 125,000

Yes the NHS was the lead in COVID not the Army

The police are the lead in UK civilian security

Might surprise you to know the Army doesn’t protect UK air bases.

Feel free to look it up but there is an organisation that has this exact job and it’s not the army

If the Brown stuff really did hit the Fan Daniele,i would happily sign up for any RAF SRF Requirement – no ifs,no buts,that would be my only offer.

The biggest pool available in a time of war will be provided by what ever organisation we today decide to fund in peace time.

Are we not better to fund a proper home defence force or a French style Gndarmerie instead of more reservist slotted into an expeditionary army that’d still heavily focused on a colonial policing via very light infantry and special forces.

Although, for balance – I led the workforce strategy for the vaccination campaign and Defence provided 56 individual vaccinators. The clinical NHS workforce was 125,000

Might surprise you that soldiers don’t usually provide care in care homes, yet they did during COVID, along with many other roles that aren’t part of their day to day job.

It’s about surge capacity under MACA during a crisis, not replacing the lead organisation.

My experience of MACA is that to be very blunt the dying has already happened before any MACA gets to a minister.

It’s an utter chocolate teapot designed by a bureaucrat in the MOD to protect their fiefdom from having requests made of it..

I’ve seen people die without aid that could have been easily given and I’ve seen managers of services who tried cross sidestep to get that aid utterly hammered.. and I’m taking about people dying in their homes when something as simple as a 4 by 4 and a drive could have made a difference…

I find MACA an utter joke and disgusting travesty to be honest…

Although, for balance – I led the workforce strategy for the vaccination campaign and Defence provided 56 individual vaccinators. The clinical NHS workforce was 125,000

They are double hatting again if they are expecting the “operational Reserve” ( assume he means the Army Reserve ) to be used for home defence. Much of the CS CSS of the Field Army is found from the Reserve, which heavily contribute to 101,102,104 Brigades, and in other areas. The RAMS Reserve forms most of 2 Medical Group, yet as J has pointed out many times is made up of NHS staff who’d be needed in hospitals at home if the balloon went up. The area that interests me is the mention of the Strategic Reserve, which could be used much better going forward, and the idea of a civilian force involved in defending CNI. Recruit it on a county basis, I’d happily get involved in that if I could contribute. On lifting the recall liability to 65, well, that’s just great. Maybe many might be happy, but from what I’m seeing, after risking life and limb then you might get dragged into the courts by the left wing lawyers and HMG for what you might have done in a split second decision while on operations, while the idle happily sit comfortable at home making no contribution??? If it were me who’d served, on your bike HMG, go and serve yourself before expecting the old and the bold to go and do it all over again, while you continue to cut the military, delay everything, and talk tough. How about having a “Corps” of economic migrants who’ve arrived over the last two decades, to help them assimilate and help the country that’s taken them in, so that they make a contribution? Otherwise, why the hell do you expect the old timers to do it all themselves, purely on their accumulated skill set?

I agree Daniele, my issue is that there is no such origination for UK home defence or mobilisation of the strategic reserve unlike the USA which has its national guard. Nor will our army ever advocate for such an organisation. It’s sees reserves as nothing more than a means to retain cap badges and provide certain civilian skills (medical, logistics etc) to the army in a time of war. I am all for a home defence force / national guard that can provide resilience but that’s not on the table as it would divert money from the professional army and would not allow them to achieve their primary goal which has always been colonial policing.

I agree Daniele, my issue is that there is no such origination for UK home defence or mobilisation of the strategic reserve unlike the USA which has its national guard.

Nor will our army ever advocate for such an organisation. It’s sees reserves as nothing more than a means to retain cap badges and provide certain civilian skills (medical, logistics etc) to the army in a time of war.

I am all for a home defence force / national guard that can provide resilience but that’s not on the table as it would divert money from the professional army and would not allow them to achieve their primary goal which has always been colonial policing.

I am a fascinated observer in this saga. Amazing that there is a sudden realisation that we need to defend our own country in time of war! I took part as a Reg (staff officer in 24 Inf Bde, Catterick) in Ex BRAVE DEFENDER in 1985. It was a UK national military home defence exercise involving about 65,000 largely army service personnel (Regular and volunteer reservists) to test ground defence of vital establishments and civil–military liaison. It included practice mobilisation, deployment, and simulated defence of installations between 2 and 13 September 1985. It was a major test of the Home Service Force (HSF) and they did a brilliant job at guarding Key Points & Vulnerable Points are much missed and should be brought back) I was detailed to plan and then oversee exercise activities in part of western Scotland. Interestingly I believe that plans for further Military Home Defence (MHD) exercises came to nothing. If so, then 1985 was the last time we really practised the defence of our own country en masse! There is no reason why MHD should be allocated solely to the reservists if there are any regular units uncommitted to continental defence. Those reservists do actually need some more kit – I doubt they even have sufficient organic transport to move themselves, let alone potent weaponry other than Small Arms.

I think one of the key differences is the reduction of reach of Russia, and the increase in physical distance from the cold war. Which in turn reduces the need for a cold war style HSF. My personal opinion is that the AR and SR should remain primarily expeditionary, and future HSF should be a more policing based organisation, rather than a military one. What does HSF need in the UK in a modern context? I don’t think anything more than small arms is really required if the biggest risk is insertion of sabotage teams via covert means at this point.

In reality would/ could it be the following 1) small insertion sabotage teams 2) political warfare operations, that will be mainly remote 3) civil disobedience and strife from political warfare 4) cyber attacks on infrastructure 5) long range drone and missile attack on infrastructure 6) nuclear, biological and chemical attack ( either from insertion, terrorist or long range delivery) 7) disruption of service attacks In reality any or all of these could require martial law to be enforced especially in large cities. It’s one of the reasons china actually has larger internal security forces than it does expeditionary military forces.. because it sees the destruction of a nations fabric as core to war.

What does HSF need in the UK in a modern context? I don’t think anything more than small arms is really required if the biggest risk is insertion of sabotage teams via covert means at this point.

In reality would/ could it be the following

1) small insertion sabotage teams 2) political warfare operations, that will be mainly remote 3) civil disobedience and strife from political warfare 4) cyber attacks on infrastructure 5) long range drone and missile attack on infrastructure 6) nuclear, biological and chemical attack ( either from insertion, terrorist or long range delivery) 7) disruption of service attacks

In reality any or all of these could require martial law to be enforced especially in large cities.

It’s one of the reasons china actually has larger internal security forces than it does expeditionary military forces.. because it sees the destruction of a nations fabric as core to war.

I would definately be intetested if in due course the government needed to form units for things like infractructure guarding or air defence units or UK. My infantry days are behind me by afew decades now though.

The thing is essentially the UK government in the 1990s decided there was no real threat to the UK home islands.. The army has for a very long time essentially been designed as a missile to aim at the enemy or defend an ally in a far off field .. The navy was designed to defend British interests and support expeditionary ventures across the globe. The airforce was essentially the same although of all the services it still had a home island focus. The problem now is the enemy can and will attack our home island.. because the world has relearned a lesson.. wars are not ended by flash and battles they are ended by grinding the enemy nations will to fight into dust.. and that means physical, political, economic, industrial and social destruction. So is we go to war with Russia it’s not going to play armies in a a foreign field… it’s going to try and blow our nations systems to dust.. it will attack politically, it will attack socially, it will attack economically, it will attack critical infrastructure as well as military targets.. And from this article it seems leaders still don’t get it… a Luke warm we will aid civil authorities is pathetic.. it will not matter what army, navy and airforce we have.. if Russia bombs the crap out of our power grid, destroys our healthcare infrastructure and then gets people out protesting the destruction the war has lead to we lose.. Nations fight wars.. if the nation gives up and the army navy and airforce do as well.. We need a completely coherent and comprehensive national mobilisation and resilience plan in which the civil and military are fully integrated.. yes expeditionary power projection is entirely the military and foreign office/ security services.. but national resilience and defence needs to be an entire national plan with everyone working in partnership or it’s no plan at all.

Yeh totally agree mate, There was an interesting piece on the BBC News recently looking at how Ukraine was developing it’s drone capabilities. One part of that that caught my attention was a civilian firm uses counter drone systems as part of the Air Defence network. The company control center was fully integrated into the military ISR and comms networks. No uniforms, no side arms just a bunch of civilians in a room full of computer screens and games consul hand sets..! Surely, the use of a modern Homeguard using drones to support the civil and military forces would be a cost effective way forward. I for one would go and pay for my drone licence if it meant I could do something useful behind a commuter screen. Cheers CR

There is a blueprint: ‘In a Comprehensive Security model, defence is not seen as an isolated policy area, but deeply interconnected with the basic functioning of what we might otherwise see as social and economic policy. Connecting individuals to this wider system is crucial to its success. The state coordinates national preparedness, but the model’s legitimacy and effectiveness come from the bottom up: namely, a population that trusts its leaders, believes in the value of its society, and is willing to defend it. The result is a model in which every sector of society has a role: government ministries, local authorities, private companies, NGOs, and, crucially, ordinary citizens. This is described by Finnish officials as a “two‑way deal.” The government creates a fair, cohesive, well‑governed country; citizens, in turn, accept real obligations such as universal conscription, widespread preparedness training, and active participation in national resilience.’ I can see one immediate problem with it over here…

The thing is essentially the UK government in the 1990s decided there was no real threat to the UK home islands..

The army has for a very long time essentially been designed as a missile to aim at the enemy or defend an ally in a far off field ..

The navy was designed to defend British interests and support expeditionary ventures across the globe.

The airforce was essentially the same although of all the services it still had a home island focus.

The problem now is the enemy can and will attack our home island.. because the world has relearned a lesson.. wars are not ended by flash and battles they are ended by grinding the enemy nations will to fight into dust.. and that means physical, political, economic, industrial and social destruction.

So is we go to war with Russia it’s not going to play armies in a a foreign field… it’s going to try and blow our nations systems to dust.. it will attack politically, it will attack socially, it will attack economically, it will attack critical infrastructure as well as military targets..

And from this article it seems leaders still don’t get it… a Luke warm we will aid civil authorities is pathetic.. it will not matter what army, navy and airforce we have.. if Russia bombs the crap out of our power grid, destroys our healthcare infrastructure and then gets people out protesting the destruction the war has lead to we lose..

Nations fight wars.. if the nation gives up and the army navy and airforce do as well..

We need a completely coherent and comprehensive national mobilisation and resilience plan in which the civil and military are fully integrated.. yes expeditionary power projection is entirely the military and foreign office/ security services.. but national resilience and defence needs to be an entire national plan with everyone working in partnership or it’s no plan at all.

Yeh totally agree mate,

There was an interesting piece on the BBC News recently looking at how Ukraine was developing it’s drone capabilities. One part of that that caught my attention was a civilian firm uses counter drone systems as part of the Air Defence network. The company control center was fully integrated into the military ISR and comms networks. No uniforms, no side arms just a bunch of civilians in a room full of computer screens and games consul hand sets..!

Surely, the use of a modern Homeguard using drones to support the civil and military forces would be a cost effective way forward. I for one would go and pay for my drone licence if it meant I could do something useful behind a commuter screen.

There is a blueprint:

‘In a Comprehensive Security model, defence is not seen as an isolated policy area, but deeply interconnected with the basic functioning of what we might otherwise see as social and economic policy.

Connecting individuals to this wider system is crucial to its success. The state coordinates national preparedness, but the model’s legitimacy and effectiveness come from the bottom up: namely, a population that trusts its leaders, believes in the value of its society, and is willing to defend it. The result is a model in which every sector of society has a role: government ministries, local authorities, private companies, NGOs, and, crucially, ordinary citizens.

This is described by Finnish officials as a “two‑way deal.” The government creates a fair, cohesive, well‑governed country; citizens, in turn, accept real obligations such as universal conscription, widespread preparedness training, and active participation in national resilience.’

I can see one immediate problem with it over here…

It is to be expected the proliferation of missiles/drones with thousand km range in next decades including conventional ICBMs. We saw Ayatollah regime lashing out up to Cyprus maybe in 15-20 years it would have been the Channel, while not same persistence as the Houthis in Red Sea, it is possible that in 15-20 years every conflict with medium powers will have thousands miles of potential radius with sea risk increasing significantly.

If I’m recalled to man a sanger at Heathrow or Luton then I’m claiming first dibs on the cream soda Panda Pops and cheese & pickle in the bag-meals 🧀😂

You will make do with the bog standard tuna in white with cucumber , this being reduced to a sophisticated slurry by compression under your kit. Don’t forget the S&V crisps reduced to shrapnel as well.

If your lucky you can have screech as well. 🙂

You’re welcome to my frozen cheese and onion pasty

If I’m recalled to man a sanger at Heathrow or Luton then I’m claiming first dibs on the cream soda Panda Pops and cheese & pickle in the bag-meals 🧀😂

If your lucky you can have screech as well. 🙂

You’re welcome to my frozen cheese and onion pasty

Erm…we had a functional HSF, After regular/TA I joined it. Ex regulars and we enjoyed it mainly. Then politicians cut it. So the structures went with it. We used to have an AFS and a fleet of pumps nationally. Politicians cut that. There used to be a drill hall in every town, there used to be cadet outfits in most secondary schools. Many lads I knew in the TA went on to become regulars. You have one million “neets”, thousands of, how can I say it? Well, imports. Make it an expectation that they contribute to the country that funds them to do what exactly? Oh, live off my taxes. Now I know I sound like a far right fascist by Leftard definitions. But I expect people to contribute, even those on spurious benefits milking the system. ps I have a current self refer to Prevent. Sadly I am told there is a fifteen year backlog of people like me who admit to being conservative and hate socialist/communists oiks….

We are committed to 2 Divisions for NATO in the event of hostilities. Those 2 Divisions include 15 reserve units. Then we have a whole bunch of critical resources like Nuclear Power Plants that could be easily be taken out by a small number of highly capable Spetsnatz teams. In other words, it’s not just about fending off an invasion.

Asymmetric warfare is the big threat. All sorts of ways that a modern nation can be attacked without a single enemy regular soldier coming anywhere near you. Russia has 100’s of ships in it’s shadow fleet and they are not all tankers. A container ship loaded with containerised drones and or missiles is entirely feasible. The threat wouldn’t entirely go away even if you cold find and stop every shadow fleet vessel as the weapon systems could be loaded onto a neutral ship without the crew knowing and fired remotely. I could dream up plenty more ways of attacking us – 9/11 taught us that anything is possible, and we shouldn’t forget it either! Cheers CR

18 Reserve Units, not couting Artillery and CS/CSS units. But 19L brigade as it stands only provides individual augmentees to the regular units, it isn’t a fighting formation.

I could dream up plenty more ways of attacking us – 9/11 taught us that anything is possible, and we shouldn’t forget it either!

18 Reserve Units, not couting Artillery and CS/CSS units. But 19L brigade as it stands only provides individual augmentees to the regular units, it isn’t a fighting formation.

On our declaration of war on Germany in 1939, a whole-of-society war plan swung into place. Barrage balloons appeared instantly over the main cities, foreign agents, fifth columnists and Nazi sympathisers were rounded up and incarcerated, valuable paintings a d works of art were quietly removed to underground storage in Wales, railways were effectively put under government control to enable troop and munitions movements, and of course industry switched to a war footing. These were just a few of hundreds of measures taken within days of our being at war. This all came from the national War Book, a nationwide plan prepared by every department.of national and local government that covered every civil sector and the wartime preparations needed. We apparently haven’t updated our War Book for decades. We face many more grey zone challenges than we did in 1939 and HMG need to roll their sleeves up pronto and get some serious plans in place across every sector of our national life. What part should the armed forces reserves play in this? There are many things they could and should do, but the obstacle here is that we have run our voluntary reserve numbers right down to pretty insignificant numbers. In 1939, we were able to mobilise 14 army reserve divisions and 13 Tier 2 TA divisions, the latter being given the ground-based air defence role. Today, we couldn’t even muster one division. This because of the ‘One Army’ doctrine, whereby the voluntary reserves are largely organised and tasked to fill the gaps in the regular army ORBAT and to provide individual reinforcements and battlefield casualty replacements [BCRs]. This One Army concept is deeply flawed. It it has been popular with politicians and Treasury mandarins because it provided a cheap alternative to maintaining regular numbers – and provided Conservative governments in particular the opportunity to sell-off hundreds of TA centres and ranges, which basically squandered the great legacy that Haldane had left us. It is flawed because it abandons the well-proven system operated by Commonwealth and US armies of augmenting their small peacetime regular forces with a large influx of trained volunteer reserves on mobilisation. The US army can field something like 10 National Guard divisions to augment their ten regular divisions. We could not now muster one. One Army is also pretty hopeless for encouraging volunteers to extend their service beyond 3 years, particularly in units which do not have a formed wartime role. The money and equipment provided to the voluntary reserves is also minimalist and rather begrudged by the cash-strapped regulars. I talk of the army here, but the same applies to all 3 services. So what to do? 30,000 voluntary reserves is far too small. We would need to double that to be of any military significance. For UK home defence, volunteer reserve units would be essential to provide a wartime level of GBAD, to guard key strategic installations, military bases, ports and the rest. Graham mentions the Home Service Force created briefly in the 80s. This drew 5,000 men from the TA into about 50 company-sized units, tasked with defending key points against sabotage, enemy raiding parties etc. It worked well enough, the number of training days was reduced considerably for the HSF, which attracted many tese4ves and former reserves. Somewhere in the corridors of power it wasn’t popular, because the HSF was scrapped after a brief existence. We need to bring that back and expand it, so that on mobilisation every critical point can be guarded and defended. Overall, the voluntary reserves of all 3 services need boosted considerably. The RNR has about 14 units meeting in stone frigates without a sea-going tender or Archer between them. Under the One Navy regime, these volunteers will act as individual augmentees to the fleet, they won’t act as formed RNR sea-going units. But on mobilisation, it would be essential to patrol off naval bases and ports for maritime security. This way though, the One Navy saves on providing patrol ships for reserves. Which is a hopeless peacetime frame of mind and lack of preparation. I think we need to see the army reserves formed into a separate command under a 3 star and a long-term expansion plan put in place, plus a useful equipment plan. The lack of equipment provided to the voluntary reserves is currently woeful.

This all came from the national War Book, a nationwide plan prepared by every department.of national and local government that covered every civil sector and the wartime preparations needed.

We apparently haven’t updated our War Book for decades. We face many more grey zone challenges than we did in 1939 and HMG need to roll their sleeves up pronto and get some serious plans in place across every sector of our national life.

What part should the armed forces reserves play in this? There are many things they could and should do, but the obstacle here is that we have run our voluntary reserve numbers right down to pretty insignificant numbers. In 1939, we were able to mobilise 14 army reserve divisions and 13 Tier 2 TA divisions, the latter being given the ground-based air defence role.

Today, we couldn’t even muster one division. This because of the ‘One Army’ doctrine, whereby the voluntary reserves are largely organised and tasked to fill the gaps in the regular army ORBAT and to provide individual reinforcements and battlefield casualty replacements [BCRs]. This One Army concept is deeply flawed. It it has been popular with politicians and Treasury mandarins because it provided a cheap alternative to maintaining regular numbers – and provided Conservative governments in particular the opportunity to sell-off hundreds of TA centres and ranges, which basically squandered the great legacy that Haldane had left us.

It is flawed because it abandons the well-proven system operated by Commonwealth and US armies of augmenting their small peacetime regular forces with a large influx of trained volunteer reserves on mobilisation. The US army can field something like 10 National Guard divisions to augment their ten regular divisions. We could not now muster one.

One Army is also pretty hopeless for encouraging volunteers to extend their service beyond 3 years, particularly in units which do not have a formed wartime role. The money and equipment provided to the voluntary reserves is also minimalist and rather begrudged by the cash-strapped regulars. I talk of the army here, but the same applies to all 3 services.

So what to do? 30,000 voluntary reserves is far too small. We would need to double that to be of any military significance.

For UK home defence, volunteer reserve units would be essential to provide a wartime level of GBAD, to guard key strategic installations, military bases, ports and the rest. Graham mentions the Home Service Force created briefly in the 80s. This drew 5,000 men from the TA into about 50 company-sized units, tasked with defending key points against sabotage, enemy raiding parties etc. It worked well enough, the number of training days was reduced considerably for the HSF, which attracted many tese4ves and former reserves. Somewhere in the corridors of power it wasn’t popular, because the HSF was scrapped after a brief existence.

We need to bring that back and expand it, so that on mobilisation every critical point can be guarded and defended.

Overall, the voluntary reserves of all 3 services need boosted considerably. The RNR has about 14 units meeting in stone frigates without a sea-going tender or Archer between them. Under the One Navy regime, these volunteers will act as individual augmentees to the fleet, they won’t act as formed RNR sea-going units. But on mobilisation, it would be essential to patrol off naval bases and ports for maritime security. This way though, the One Navy saves on providing patrol ships for reserves. Which is a hopeless peacetime frame of mind and lack of preparation.

I think we need to see the army reserves formed into a separate command under a 3 star and a long-term expansion plan put in place, plus a useful equipment plan. The lack of equipment provided to the voluntary reserves is currently woeful.

Of course they could. They’ve done it before. ‘Wait a minute. I’ve had an idea. – Be careful, sir. Please, be careful. River patrols! That’s it, Wilson – river patrols! Half a dozen determined men armed to the teeth with a boat, they could play havoc with the Nazis. What? Do you see it? Swift, silent patrols hitting the enemy where it hurts most, then disappearing into the night, quietly, without a sound, silently. Cutting through the water. Muffled oars, of course. – Muffled oars? Oh, yes. That’s how Wolfe captured Quebec. – Oh, really? Rowed up the St Lawrence with muffled oars. Taught those Froggies a thing or two. What exactly are muffled oars? Well…We’d ask somebody about that. We’re on duty five nights a week, from the Novelty Rock Emporium to Godfrey’s cottage. The railway bridge, the gasworks, the telephone exchange, mobile patrols in Jones’s van. I mean, really Isn’t it… It’s, It’s too much. Do I detect a slight lack of enthusiasm in your voice? We must have some rest, sir. I realise that. I only want to try the thing out. Today’s Friday. The next parade is on Sunday morning. I’ll tell you what we’ll do. We’ll try it out after tea this afternoon’

Dad’s Army. Brilliant show. Having said that the real Dad’s Army was a bit tougher than the TV series portrayed on account many of the volunteers were WW1 vets, so had some experience..! I read an account somewhere a couple of years ago where a young regular stated that they hated going up against the Home Guard because if they caught a regular they could be somewhat less than gentle..! Having said that I have heard some hilarious tells of mishaps during training. Cheers CR

‘Don’t tell him your name, Pike!’

Oh, that has got to be one of the best one liners ever..! Corporal Jones’ inventions, like the gas powered delivery truck used as a IFV. Remember that one, he had is bayonet fixed in anti-aircraft mode… Making me chuckle just thinking about it! 🙂 Cheers CR

And, of course, let us not forget the lugubrious and all too prescient Private Fraser who summed up this country’s current predicament perfectly…

We’re doomed, we’re all doomed I tell ya! 🙂 Used that phrase on here a few times myself..!

Of course they could. They’ve done it before.

‘Wait a minute. I’ve had an idea.

– Be careful, sir. Please, be careful.

River patrols! That’s it, Wilson – river patrols! Half a dozen determined men armed to the teeth with a boat, they could play havoc with the Nazis. What? Do you see it? Swift, silent patrols hitting the enemy where it hurts most, then disappearing into the night, quietly, without a sound, silently. Cutting through the water. Muffled oars, of course.

Oh, yes. That’s how Wolfe captured Quebec.

Rowed up the St Lawrence with muffled oars. Taught those Froggies a thing or two.

What exactly are muffled oars?

Well…We’d ask somebody about that.

We’re on duty five nights a week, from the Novelty Rock Emporium to Godfrey’s cottage. The railway bridge, the gasworks, the telephone exchange, mobile patrols in Jones’s van. I mean, really Isn’t it… It’s, It’s too much.

Do I detect a slight lack of enthusiasm in your voice?

We must have some rest, sir.

I realise that. I only want to try the thing out. Today’s Friday. The next parade is on Sunday morning. I’ll tell you what we’ll do. We’ll try it out after tea this afternoon’

‘Don’t tell him your name, Pike!’

And, of course, let us not forget the lugubrious and all too prescient Private Fraser who summed up this country’s current predicament perfectly…

We’re doomed, we’re all doomed I tell ya! 🙂 Used that phrase on here a few times myself..!

Dad’s Army. Brilliant show.

Having said that the real Dad’s Army was a bit tougher than the TV series portrayed on account many of the volunteers were WW1 vets, so had some experience..! I read an account somewhere a couple of years ago where a young regular stated that they hated going up against the Home Guard because if they caught a regular they could be somewhat less than gentle..! Having said that I have heard some hilarious tells of mishaps during training.

‘Don’t tell him your name, Pike!’

And, of course, let us not forget the lugubrious and all too prescient Private Fraser who summed up this country’s current predicament perfectly…

We’re doomed, we’re all doomed I tell ya! 🙂 Used that phrase on here a few times myself..!

‘Don’t tell him your name, Pike!’

And, of course, let us not forget the lugubrious and all too prescient Private Fraser who summed up this country’s current predicament perfectly…

We’re doomed, we’re all doomed I tell ya! 🙂 Used that phrase on here a few times myself..!

And, of course, let us not forget the lugubrious and all too prescient Private Fraser who summed up this country’s current predicament perfectly…

We’re doomed, we’re all doomed I tell ya! 🙂 Used that phrase on here a few times myself..!

And, of course, let us not forget the lugubrious and all too prescient Private Fraser who summed up this country’s current predicament perfectly…

We’re doomed, we’re all doomed I tell ya! 🙂 Used that phrase on here a few times myself..!

We’re doomed, we’re all doomed I tell ya! 🙂

Used that phrase on here a few times myself..!

Anything less than a British army of at least 100,000 soldiers and 300 CR3 Challengers is utterly ridiculous.

Challengers CR3 I mean.

If we need the reserves for defence, it means that the main armed forces have been either wiped out on the way or is seriously weakened. The question so what heavy weapons does the reserves have. Having number is fine but if they really are going to defend the country then they also need firepower. That is the problem that their era equivalent had in ww2, large numbers of volunteers but almost zero fire power.

The Reserve have some Light Gun artillery, and MLRS. Neither are for home defence. Beyond that, small arms and the fire support weapons of the Infantry Battalions, GPMG, 81mm, NLAW, and so on. Assume there is a Javelin allocation, but I don’t think much. Defence of KPs and regional reaction forces won’t need heavy weapons. Cyber, and GBAD I’d think are also high priorities.

Except. What was the loadout of PARA and Cmdo during the Falklands? I wouldn’t put down UK Infantry; of course they need more and we need more AR with both more, SHORAD (GBAD) and protected mobility vehicles.

The problem is that if the Reserves are physically defending the UK against an actual invasion then it means all of Europe has fallen realistically. We are one of the most distant targets for any potential adversary, and one of the hardest to launch an invasion against. So as a planning assumption that’s a not a contingency you really want to be planning for. (Want as in “There are so many more likely situations to plan against” not “this is so terrible we don’t feel like planning for it”).

Agreed but the one thing you would want is shore defences. Which we have zero of. I really don’t get why as an island nation we don’t have any form of land based anti shipping missiles.

In war I think Russian ships stay tied to their bastions, so nothing to use these shore based ASM against. If there are a few Russian ships about at the point it goes hot, more fool them. If we have to fund an ASM purchase, put it on something flexible. Air power! So it can be used where it’s needed.

Heavy Weight Anti-Shipping Missiles are not a hugely effective anti shipping weapon, unless we’re talking about somewhere like the Baltic where shipping is constrained to be close to the shore. Stratus RS fired from Aircraft is a much better solution for the UK.

I wouldn’t go heavy weight, the aim would be to sink transport ships not destroyers. Agree air based would be best but any layered defence should just be that, not rely on just one option.

Why would the goal be to sink transport ships? Are we back to some weird 1940’s Britain alone fantasy? Because if not there is very little point in aiming to sink transport ships with shore based ASuM’s. If we are playing with that fantasy I point once again to “Defence needs to be much further forwards than the last country in Europe to be physically invaded.” Also lightweight anti-ship missiles fired from shore are even less effective than heavy ones.

Except. What was the loadout of PARA and Cmdo during the Falklands?

I wouldn’t put down UK Infantry; of course they need more and we need more AR with both more, SHORAD (GBAD) and protected mobility vehicles.

Agreed but the one thing you would want is shore defences. Which we have zero of. I really don’t get why as an island nation we don’t have any form of land based anti shipping missiles.

I wouldn’t go heavy weight, the aim would be to sink transport ships not destroyers. Agree air based would be best but any layered defence should just be that, not rely on just one option.

Agreed but the one thing you would want is shore defences. Which we have zero of. I really don’t get why as an island nation we don’t have any form of land based anti shipping missiles.

I wouldn’t go heavy weight, the aim would be to sink transport ships not destroyers. Agree air based would be best but any layered defence should just be that, not rely on just one option.

Agreed but the one thing you would want is shore defences. Which we have zero of. I really don’t get why as an island nation we don’t have any form of land based anti shipping missiles.

I wouldn’t go heavy weight, the aim would be to sink transport ships not destroyers. Agree air based would be best but any layered defence should just be that, not rely on just one option.

Also lightweight anti-ship missiles fired from shore are even less effective than heavy ones.

I think the answer Is Drones.

Realistically it probably is. The reserve should be structured and trainee to fight an insurgency style warfare. Since if any enemy makes it across the channel the nation will fall and then it’s a question of some form of resistance force making occupation too expensive for the enemy

Wonder where the redoubts are in the Home Counties! Apparently many took the secret of their location with them when they passed. And which reserve do you mean? As the Army Reserve is needed to enable the regular Army, so the Field Army, abroad, where it’s best used. If you mean a hypothetical civilian reserve to defend their local areas only, then yes, CUAS, Cyber, small arms to defend KPs.

The topic was home defence. Cyber isn’t the role of the military it’s the role of GCHQ / national cyber centre, neither is part of the military.

Hi Steve. With respect, you’re veey, very, wrong there. I’ll outline, as it’s extensive. 13 Regiment Royal Signals is a Cyber Regiment in the British Army. They defend against Cyber attacks in the field. 10 Regiment Roysl Signals has Cyber elements, including Squadrons that protect the fixed home base, military networks, work alongside the GOSCC at Corsham, and so on. The military have a CEMAG, Cyber Electromagnetic Activities Group. A tri service organisation under CSOC, Cyber Specialist Operations Command ( see the reference again ? ) Beneath it is a Joint Cyber Group. The Joint Cyber Group has “Joint Cyber Units” JCU Corsham, JCU Cheltenham ( military working at GCHQ ) and a JCU Reserve at a location I won’t name as I don’t think it’s been widely advertised. There is also a bigger Cyber Reserve Force with units from the RAF and RN as well. The RAF have 90 SU, within it is a Cyber Ops Defence Centre that protects the RAF. The RN have a unit within another organisation at Portsdown Hill involved in Cyber defence of the RN. The DSF, Directorate of Special Forces, has elements attached involved in Cyber that I won’t name. As part of the rebranding going on, an entire Cyber Command is being created. Alongside this, the National Cyber Force is forming made up of MoD ( so including military ) the SIS, GCHQ, and DSTL. It’s all classified, but look up online something called PAGC regards the military in recruitment adverts and you’ll be on the right track. While you’re right in saying GCHQ and the NCSC are not military or MoD, there is extensive cross staffing. Indeed, much of GCHQs wider SIGINT ELINT take is staffed by the military, a different subject I won’t detail. Hope I’ve posted something of interest, not at home so cannot go into greater detail by referring to my notes.👍

Just talking different things. They are designed to protect the military assets, not the country from a cyber attack. Both essential but different purposes.

Well, I’ll give you that if that was your meaning, yet there are those tri service bods working in the Donut integrated with the civvies. The type of Cyber needs discussing as well, offensive or defensive. GCHQ military are involved in both.

Yeah i just assume if the reserves are needed to defend the UK, then all that resources would have already been deployed abroad and overrun, unless the war was with france or ireland which seems highly unlikely. At which point you need actual hardpower to defend the country. Whether that is through missiles /guns to stop ships crossing the channel loaded with troops and equipment or through gorrilla warfare operations. Cyber attacks on the enemy would be useful but at that point it would be too late.

Yes, much too late. I don’t think resources will ever be found for such. But CUAS, a volunteer HSF type org to go and protect local CNI, that seems plausible to me, and highly desirable.